Automatic Proofs of Privacy of Secure Multi-party Computation Protocols against Active Adversaries
Automatic Proofs of Privacy of Secure Multi-party Computation Protocols against Active Adversaries
复制标题
针对活跃对手的安全多方计算协议的隐私自动证明
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Peeter Laud
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Martin Pettai;Peeter Laud
我们描述了一种自动分析来检查安全多方计算协议的隐私泄露。分析是合理的--被认为是私有的协议不会泄露其私有输入的任何信息，即使对其执行了主动攻击。针对主动对手的隐私是旨在提供中等(介于被动和主动)强度的对抗性模型中的安全性(隐私+正确性)的构造的重要组成部分。通过我们的分析，我们能够证明SHAREMIND安全多方计算平台使用的协议是主动私有的。
We describe an automatic analysis to check secure multi-party computation protocols against privacy leaks. The analysis is sound -- a protocol that is deemed private does not leak anything about its private inputs, even if active attacks are performed against it. Privacy against active adversaries is an essential ingredient in constructions aiming to provide security (privacy + correctness) in adversarial models of intermediate (between passive and active) strength. Using our analysis we are able to show that the protocols used by the SHAREMIND secure multi-party computation platform are actively private.