Autozoography: Notes Toward a Rhetoricity of the Living
Autozoography: Notes Toward a Rhetoricity of the Living
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自传：对生者修辞的笔记
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发表时间：
2014
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Davis
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文献类型：
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作者：
D. Davis
在哲学和修辞学研究中，自我认识是区分“人”和“动物”的绝对不可分割的界线。自我指示，即“我”的自我反身能力，既是语言习得的条件，也是理性的条件;它命名了一种特殊的自体情感，在这种情感中，一个存在者展示了从自身后退到足以认识自身的能力，从而把自己称为自己。然而，我在这篇文章中提出的是，自我指示并不涉及一种特定的人类力量来揭示一种本体论本身（如海德格尔所希望的），而是一种寓言性的仿佛的超人类操作。自我认识的假设不是“人”的固有品质，而是任何生物必须重复自己才能成为自己的已经存在的关系条件。我认为，一种先生的相似性是任何生物的独特性和功能的条件。
In philosophy and rhetorical studies, self-knowledge inscribes the absolutely indivisible line that separates “the human” from “the animal.” Autodeixis, the self-reflexive power of the I, is the condition both for language acquisition and for reason; it names an exceptional sort of auto–affection in which a being demonstrates the capacity to step back from itself enough to recognize itself and so to refer to itself as itself. What I propose in this article, however, is that autodeixis involves not a specifically human power to disclose an ontological as such (as Heidegger wanted) but the extrahuman operations of an allegorical as if. The presumption of self-knowledge is not an innate quality of “the human” but the already relational condition for any living being that must repeat itself to be itself. A kind of preorigi-nary rhetoricity, I argue, is the very condition for the singularity and functioning of any living being.