Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization
Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization
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DOI：
10.1108/ebr.2001.05413cab.010
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发表时间：
2000-11
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Baldwin;P. Krugman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Baldwin;P. Krugman
我们发现，集聚力可以扭转标准的国际税收竞争的结果。更紧密的一体化可能首先导致“向上竞争”，然后是"向下竞争“，这一结果与最近的实证研究相一致，即富国和穷国之间的税收差距遵循钟形路径（Devereux，Griffith and Klemm 2002）。此外，差额税收协调可能会使两国的情况更糟。这可能有助于解释为什么税收协调在标准模型中是帕累托改进在真实的世界中是如此困难。关键的理论见解是，集聚力创造了准租金，可以在不引起搬迁的情况下征税。这表明，税收游戏比逐底竞争更微妙。发达的“核心”国家可能会像限制定价的竞争者一样对待欠发达的“外围”国家。由于集聚租金是一体化水平的钟形函数，因此我们税收博弈中的均衡税收差距也是钟形的。
We show that agglomeration forces can reverse standard international-tax-competition results. Closer integration may result first in a race to the top' and then a race to the bottom, a result that is consistent with recent empirical work showing that the tax gap between rich and poor nations follows a bell-shaped path (Devereux, Griffith and Klemm 2002). Moreover, split-the-difference tax harmonization can make both nations worse off. This may help explain why tax harmonisation which is Pareto improving in the standard model is so difficult in the real world. The key theoretical insight is that agglomeration forces create quasi-rents that can be taxed without inducing delocation. This suggests that the tax game is something subtler than a race to the bottom. Advanced 'core' nations may act like limit-pricing monopolists toward less advanced 'periphery' countries. Since agglomeration rents are a bell-shaped function of the level of integration, the equilibrium tax gap in our tax game is also bell shaped.