After the Massacre: Mobilization in the Wake of Harsh Repression
After the Massacre: Mobilization in the Wake of Harsh Repression
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大屠杀之后：严厉镇压后的动员
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ronald A. Francisco
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ronald A. Francisco
大屠杀后持不同政见者会怎么做？这篇文章用31次残酷的镇压来测试集体行动理论在最严酷的背景下的表现。大屠杀之后，持不同政见者对政府感到愤怒，但也害怕进一步的镇压。在这种情况下，持不同政见者能否发动强烈的抗议？报告显示，通常有足够的大屠杀沟通，使后续的反弹动员。此外，大屠杀后的领导层有足够的连续性来协调反弹抗议。屠杀事件的领导层要么保持原职，要么在事件发生后立即被有效替换。此外，在大多数情况下，持不同政见的领导人使用适应性策略来逃避随后的镇压。一项针对动员的贝叶斯更新测试表明，镇压会减少反弹抗议，而不镇压会增加反弹。本报告的结论是，即使在这种极具挑战性的情况下，集体行动理论仍然有效。
What do dissidents do after a massacre? This article uses thirty-one brutal repressions to test collective-action theory in the harshest possible context. After a massacre, dissidents are outraged at the state, but also fearful of further repression. Can dissidents mobilize backlash protests in these circumstances? The report shows that there usually is sufficient communication of the massacre to enable subsequent backlash mobilization. Also, there is sufficient continuity in leadership after the massacre to coordinate backlash protest. The massacre-event leadership either remains in tact or is immediately and effectively replaced after the event. Moreover, dissident leaders use adaptive tactics to elude subsequent repression in most cases. A Bayesian updating test for mobilization shows that repression reduces backlash protests and that no repression increases backlash. This report concludes by affirming that collective-action theory works even in this highly challenging situation.