Sartre’s Transcendental Phenomenology
Sartre’s Transcendental Phenomenology
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萨特的先验现象学
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Webber
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作者：
J. Webber
胡塞尔哲学出版物的第一阶段表现出对胡塞尔先验转向的明显矛盾心理。他接受这一转向的两个主要方面，现象学还原和先验论证的使用。然而，他对胡塞尔从这种先验转向中得出的先验自我的拒斥忽视了一个明显的支持先验自我的先验论证，而且，他关于情感和想象的著作对经验世界的先验构成只作了非常简短的评论。在每一种情况下，这些都出现在书的结尾，似乎与书的中心分析相矛盾。然而，在他第一次接触胡塞尔的作品十年之后，当他在《存在与虚无》中阐述自己的先验现象学和本体论时，他的现象学心理学作品的这些特征背后的问题得到了澄清和解决。这个解决方案提出了一个新的问题，激发了他哲学的下一个阶段。
The first phase of Sartre’s philosophical publications displays an apparent ambivalence toward Husserl’s transcendental turn. Sartre accepts both major aspects of that turn, the phenomenological reduction and the use of transcendental argumentation. Yet his rejection of the transcendental ego that Husserl derives from this transcendental turn overlooks an obvious transcendental argument in favor of it. His books on emotion and imagination, moreover, make only very brief comments about the transcendental constitution of the world of experience. In each case, these appear at the end of the book and can seem to contradict the book’s central analysis. The problem underlying these features of his works of phenomenological psychology is clarified and resolved, however, when Sartre articulates his own transcendental phenomenology and ontology in Being and Nothingness a decade after he first encountered the work of Husserl. This resolution raises a new problem that animates the next phase of his philosophy.