On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice
On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice
复制标题
论平等正义的货币
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00068.x
复制
发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Jenkins
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Jenkins
在他1979年的坦纳讲座中题为“什么的平等？”Amartya Sen问平等主义者应该使用什么度量标准来确定他们的理想在给定社会中实现的程度。对于平等主义者来说，一个人的状况的哪些方面应该被视为根本，而不仅仅是他们认为根本的原因、证据或代理？在这项研究中，我研究了这个问题的答案，以及在最近的哲学文献中与这个问题有关的讨论。我理所当然地认为，正义要求人们拥有同等数量的某些东西，不是无论如何，而是在与分配平等竞争的价值观所允许的范围内；我研究了一些持平等主义观点的作者对人们应该更加平等的维度或尊重的看法，当其他价值观走向更大的平等的代价并非不可容忍时。对于森的问题，我也有自己的回答。我的回答是对罗纳德·德沃金的内在批判的产物，也就是说，它拒绝德沃金所宣称的立场，因为它与它自己的潜在动机不一致。我对德沃金的回答受到了理查德·阿内森（Richard Arneson）倡导“福利机会平等”的影响，但我对森问题的回答并不是阿内森式的，也没有阿内森的回答那么清晰它需要进一步的完善，但我仍然在这里以一个粗略的形式呈现它，因为它与我认为对其他人的相对完整的批评有关。如果这项研究有助于理解，那么更多的是因为这些批评，而不是因为它所肯定的积极学说。
In his Tanner Lecture of 1979 called “Equality of What?” Amartya Sen asked what metric egalitarians should use to establish the extent to which their ideal is realized in a given society. What aspect(s) of a person’s condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians, and not merely as cause of or evidence of or proxy for what they regard as fundamental? In this study I examine answers to that question, and discussions bearing on that question, in recent philosophical literature. I take for granted that there is something which justice requires people to have equal amounts of, not no matter what, but to whatever extent is allowed by values which compete with distributive equality; and I study what a number of authors who share that egalitarian view have said about the dimension(s) or respect(s) in which people should be made more equal, when the price in other values of moving toward greater equality is not intolerable. I also advance an answer of my own to Sen’s question. My answer is the product of an immanent critique of Ronald Dworkin, one, that is, which rejects Dworkin’s declared position because it is not congruent with its own underlying motivation. My response to Dworkin has been influenced by Richard Arneson’s work in advocacy of “equality of opportunity for welfare,” but my answer to Sen’s question is not that Arnesonian one, nor is my answer as well formulated as Arneson’s is.1 It needs much further refinement, but I nevertheless present it here, in a rough-and-ready form, because of its association with relatively fi nished criticisms of others which I think are telling. If this study contributes to understanding, it does so more because of those criticisms than because of the positive doctrine it affi rms.