Price Floors and Externality Correction*
Price Floors and Externality Correction*
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价格下限和外部性修正*
DOI：
10.1093/ej/ueac011
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Griffith R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Griffith R
我们使用双重差分策略，以英格兰作为对照组，评估了 2018 年苏格兰引入的酒精价格下限的影响。我们表明，该政策导致饮酒量最大的人群购买酒精单位的量最大减少，而该人群在边际上可能会因饮酒而产生最大的外部效应。价格下限非常适合酗酒者，因为他们购买的大部分单位是廉价产品，并且强烈放弃这些产品，而对更昂贵产品的替代有限。我们表明，如果重度饮酒者的饮酒边际外部成本至少略高于少量饮酒者，那么价格下限优于乙醇税。然而，更灵活的税收制度可以实现与价格下限类似的外部性减少，但可以避免在价格下限下出现从公共资金向酒精行业的大量转移。
We evaluate the impact of a price floor for alcohol introduced in Scotland in 2018, using a difference-in-differences strategy with England as a control group. We show that the policy led to the largest reductions in alcohol units purchased among the heaviest drinkers—the group who, at the margin, are likely to create the largest externalities from drinking. The price floor is well targeted at heavy drinkers because they buy a much greater fraction of their units from cheap products and switched away from these products strongly, with only limited substitution towards more expensive products. We show that if the marginal external cost of drinking is at least moderately higher for heavy than lighter drinkers, then a price floor outperforms an ethanol tax. However, more flexible tax systems can achieve similar reductions in externalities to the price floor, but avoid the large transfers from public funds to the alcohol industry that arise under the floor.