The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool
The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool
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DOI：
10.1007/s10603-004-7298-6
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发表时间：
2005-03-01
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Spiller, Achim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jahn, Gabriele;Schramm, Matthias;Spiller, Achim
鉴于食品行业的认证体系数量众多，令人惊讶的是认证经济学的研究方法却很少。认证计划用于确保对不可观察的质量属性的营销声明。在信息不对称的情况下，有机农业、动物福利或公平贸易等面向过程的质量特征引发了错误标签的问题。从长远来看，只有可靠的控制程序才能降低食品丑闻的风险。本文提出了一个模型，其中包括提高认证体系和相应标签效率的几个起点。总体来看，认证市场价格战的趋势和绩效的巨大差异揭示了制度变革的必要性。建议采取减少审计师依赖、强化责任、增加声誉效应和最小化审计成本的策略。最后，讨论了公共和私人监测的政策影响。
Given the large number of certification systems in the food industry, it is surprising that there are only a few research approaches to the economics of certification. Certification schemes are used to ensure marketing claims for unobservable quality attributes. Under asymmetric information, process-oriented quality characteristics such as organic farming, animal welfare, or fair trade raise the question of mislabelling. In the long run, only a reliable control procedure can reduce the risk of food scandals. The article presents a model which includes several starting points to enhance the efficiency of certification systems and the corresponding labels. On the whole, tendencies towards price wars on the certification market and considerable differences in performance reveal the necessity of institutional changes. Strategies for reducing auditors' dependence, intensifying liability, increasing reputation effects, and minimizing audit costs are suggested. Finally, policy implications for public and private monitoring are discussed.