Social dilemma alleviated by sharing the gains with immediate neighbors.
Social dilemma alleviated by sharing the gains with immediate neighbors.
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DOI：
10.1103/physreve.89.012109
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发表时间：
2014-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Zhi-Xi Wu;Han-Xin Yang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhi-Xi Wu;Han-Xin Yang
本文研究了进化空间囚徒困境博弈（PDG）和雪堆博弈（SG）中的合作演化，在这两种博弈中，每个参与者从直接博弈互动中获得的收益中有一小部分α被近邻平均分享。因此，参数α的大小表征了相邻参与者之间的关联程度。通过广泛的蒙特卡罗模拟以及扩展的平均场近似方法，我们跟踪了稳态下的合作频率。我们发现，在这两种研究的游戏中，插入相关性可以显著促进合作的进化。出乎意料的是，如果相互合作的关联度和成本效益比制定得当，在空间PDG中比在空间SG中更容易建立合作。本文还简要讨论了我们的模型与利益相关者理论的相关性。
We study the evolution of cooperation in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) and snowdrift game (SG), within which a fraction α of the payoffs of each player gained from direct game interactions is shared equally by the immediate neighbors. The magnitude of the parameter α therefore characterizes the degree of the relatedness among the neighboring players. By means of extensive Monte Carlo simulations as well as an extended mean-field approximation method, we trace the frequency of cooperation in the stationary state. We find that plugging into relatedness can significantly promote the evolution of cooperation in the context of both studied games. Unexpectedly, cooperation can be more readily established in the spatial PDG than that in the spatial SG, given that the degree of relatedness and the cost-to-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation are properly formulated. The relevance of our model with the stakeholder theory is also briefly discussed.