Optimal economic stabilization policies under decentralized control and conflicting objectives
Optimal economic stabilization policies under decentralized control and conflicting objectives
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DOI：
10.1109/cdc.1976.267812
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发表时间：
1976-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Pindyck
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Pindyck
本文在假设货币和财政控制由不同目标的不同当局执行的情况下，推导出最优稳定政策的计算方法。每个权威机构都在线性计量模型的约束下最小化自己的二次成本函数。在开环和闭环行为的背景下，为这个离散时间微分博弈计算纳什解策略（在闭环框架中，每个权威机构都可以不断修改自己的政策，以响应其他权威机构不断发展的策略）。结果应用于一个小型计量经济模型，并显示财政或货币控制的程度如何取决于特定的冲突情况，以及与协调的政策相比，冲突政策是如何“次优”的。
This paper derives methods for the calculation of optimal stabilization policies under the assumption that monetary and fiscal control are exercised by separate authorities who may have different objectives. Each authority minimizes its own quadratic cost functional subject to the constraint of a linear econometric model. Nash solution strategies are calculated for this discrete-time differential game, both in the context of open-loop and closed-loop behavior (in the closed-loop framework each authority can continually revise his policy in response to the evolving strategy of the other authority). The results are applied to a small econometric model, and show how the degree of fiscal or monetary control depends on the particular conflict situation, and how conflicting policies are "sub-optimal" in comparison with coordinated policies.