Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences
Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences
复制标题
策略证明的社会选择对应
DOI：
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Arunava Sen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Barberà;Bhaskar Dutta;Arunava Sen
摘要 我们研究了构建策略证明规则的可能性，该规则根据代理对这些集合的偏好来选择替代方案集。我们考虑对个人偏好范围的两个限制。假设所有单例都在规则的范围内，我们表明只有独裁规则才能在更大的领域上获得策略证明。较小的域还允许选择两个固定代理的最佳元素集的规则。经济文献期刊分类号：D71。
Abstract We study the possibilities of constructing strategy-proof rules that choose sets of alternatives as a function of agents' preferences over such sets. We consider two restrictions on the domain of individual preferences over sets. Assuming that all singletons are in the range of the rule, we show that only dictatorial rules can be strategy-proof on the larger domain. The smaller domain also allows for rules which select the set of best elements of two fixed agents. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D71.