Unconditionally Secure Approximate Message Authentication
Unconditionally Secure Approximate Message Authentication
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-01877-0_19
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发表时间：
2009-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Dongvu Tonien;R. Safavi-Naini;P. Nickolas;Y. Desmedt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dongvu Tonien;R. Safavi-Naini;P. Nickolas;Y. Desmedt
近似消息认证码（AMAC）自然出现在生物特征和多媒体应用中，其中明文是模糊的，并且标记消息（x′，t）（其中为消息x的计算标记是“接近”tox′）应该通过验证测试。明文的模糊性可能是由于多种因素造成的，包括对数据进行压缩和解压缩等可接受的变换，或传感器在阅读生物特征数据时的不准确性。给出了AMAC的形式化定义，分析了AMAC的两种攻击方式：模仿攻击和替换攻击。我们推导出在这些攻击对手的欺骗概率的下界的假设下，所有的密钥是等概率的。我们的界限推广了经典认证理论中已知的组合界限。
Approximate message authentication codes (AMAC) arise naturally in biometric and multimedia applications where plaintexts arefuzzyand a tagged message (x′,t) wheretis the calculated tag for a messagexthat is ‘close’ tox′ should pass the verification test. Fuzziness of plaintexts can be due to a variety of factors including applying acceptable transforms such as compression and decompression to data, or inaccuracy of sensors in reading biometric data.This paper develops a framework for approximate message authentication systems inunconditionally security setting. We give formal definition of AMAC and analyze two attacks, impersonation attack and substitution attack. We derive lower bounds on an opponent’s deception probability in these attacks under the assumption that all keys are equiprobable. Our bounds generalize known combinatorial bounds in classical authentication theory.