LeChatelier-Samuelson Principle in Games and Pass-Through of Shocks
LeChatelier-Samuelson Principle in Games and Pass-Through of Shocks
复制标题
游戏中的勒夏特利-萨缪尔森原理和冲击传递
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2693281
复制
发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Özlem Bedre
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Alexandrov;Özlem Bedre
我们表明，勒查特里耶-萨缪尔森原则适用于许多战略环境：调整参数的变化（冲击）在短期内（只有一个球员）的幅度小于调整在长期内（允许其他球员调整）。我们表明，该原则适用于超级模块化的游戏（战略补充），无论是否直接影响只有一个球员的行动（“特质”休克）的冲击。该原则适用于子模块博弈（战略替代），如果冲击是特殊的，只有两个参与者。我们提供了一个简单的充分条件的原则，在子模块游戏举行两个以上的球员。如果冲击不是特殊的，那么这个原则在次模块博弈中可能就不成立了。我们表明，我们的研究结果解释了故障的原则，以及在非战略环境中，我们的研究结果适用于多产品垄断和寡头垄断的成本传递，并认为，该原则可能会解释过度转移的成本和税收变化的实证研究结果。
We show that the LeChatelier-Samuelson principle holds in many strategic environments: the adjustment to changes in parameters (shocks) in the short run (only by one player) is smaller in magnitude than the adjustment in the long run (allowing other players to adjust as well). We show that the principle holds for supermodular games (strategic complements) regardless of whether the shock directly affects only one player's action ("idiosyncratic" shock). The principle holds for submodular games (strategic substitutes) if the shock is idiosyncratic and there are only two players. We provide a simple sufficient condition for the principle to hold in submodular games with more than two players. The principle might fail to hold in submodular games if the shock is not idiosyncratic. We show that our findings explain the breakdown of the principle in non-strategic environments as well, apply our results to multiproduct monopoly and oligopoly cost pass-through, and argue that the principle might explain the empirical findings of overshifting of cost and tax changes.