Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms
Theoretical and experimental investigations of the performance of keyword auction mechanisms
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DOI：
10.1111/1756-2171.12026
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发表时间：
2013-09
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Emiko Fukuda;Yoshio Kamijo;Ai Takeuchi;M. Masui;Yukihiko Funaki
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作者：
Emiko Fukuda;Yoshio Kamijo;Ai Takeuchi;M. Masui;Yukihiko Funaki
对广义第二价格拍卖（GSP）和Vickrey-Clarke-Groves机制（VCG）这两种关键词拍卖机制进行了理论和实验比较。前者在实践中应用广泛；后者并非如此，但它具有主导战略均衡，所有参与者都出价自己的真实价值。在理论研究中，通过将“局部无嫉妒纳什均衡”应用到VCG中，我们发现两种机制下的分配是有效的，并且拍卖商收益的上界和下界是重合的。两种机制的收入和效率相似的实验室实验支持了这一结果
Two keyword auction mechanisms, the Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG), were compared theoretically and experimentally. The former is widely used in practice; the latter is not, but it has a dominant strategy equilibrium where all participants bid their true values. In the theoretical investigation, by applying the �locally envy-free Nash equilibrium� to the VCG, we found that the allocations are efficient and that upper and lower bounds of the auctioneer's revenue coincide in the two mechanisms. A laboratory experiment, in which the revenues and efficiencies were similar in both mechanisms, supported this result