Commodity Tax Competition and Cross-border Shopping in a Tripoint Model
Commodity Tax Competition and Cross-border Shopping in a Tripoint Model
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三点模型下的商品税收竞争与跨境购物
DOI：
10.1007/s41685-022-00235-w
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发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Kojun Hamada
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gunji Hiroshi;Miura Kazuki;Yuan Yuan;西立野修平;Kojun Hamada
本文将商品税收竞争扩展到具有三点边界的三国两国模型中的跨境购物，并考察了税收竞争是否存在纯策略纳什均衡。首先，与已有的两国模型研究不同，三国三角点模型不存在税收竞争的纯策略纳什均衡。其次，我们考虑了两国之间的部分税收协调，并研究了两国人口规模如何影响税收协调下的纳什均衡税率和税收收入。我们的研究结果表明，纯策略纳什均衡的存在仅限于两个国家的特定情况。当三个拥有三角点的国家进行税收竞争时，我们无法根据纳什均衡预测政府间财政博弈的结果。此外，附录关注的是边际防偏差税率，而不是纳什均衡，并比较了两组税率之间的税率和税收收入。
This paper extends commodity tax competition to cross-border shopping in a two-country model of three countries with a tripoint border and investigates whether a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of tax competition exists. First, we find that unlike existing studies on the two-country model, there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for tax competition in the three-country tripoint model. Second, we consider partial tax coordination between two countries and investigate how the population size of the countries affects the Nash equilibrium tax rates and tax revenues under tax coordination. Our results suggest that the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is limited to a specific case of only two countries. When three countries with a tripoint engage in tax competition, we cannot predict what happens in the fiscal game between governments by the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, the Appendix focuses on the marginally deviation-proof sets of tax rates instead of the Nash equilibrium and compares tax rates and tax revenues among the two sets of tax rates.