The Bureaucratization of the State and the Rise of Japan
The Bureaucratization of the State and the Rise of Japan
复制标题
国家的官僚化与日本的崛起
DOI：
10.2307/590782
复制
发表时间：
1988
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
J. Fulcher
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Fulcher
日本的崛起可以用一个极其官僚国家的发展来解释。这是由于16世纪出现了一个与土地分离的统治性工薪阶层，最终被该工薪阶层的革命部分推翻了前现代国家，并随后建立了一个现代国家。日本早期的军事扩张是在这些官僚的高度理性指导下进行的。然而，到了1930年代，军事扩张变得非理性，变得不顾成本和后果，甚至自我毁灭，但这并不是因为非理性力量的复苏，而是因为官僚国家潜在的解体。失败为在变化的国际形势下恢复经济扩张扫清了道路。然而，经济增长并不是自动发生的，而是由经济官僚机构指导的，经济官僚机构利用了战前官僚机构创建的机构。可以说，经济扩张也变得非理性和自我破坏，但与军事扩张的相似之处不应该太过分，因为对西方来说，对抗经济扩张比对抗军事扩张要困难得多。对日本国家的起源、发展和扩张的分析是在马克思主义和韦伯理论之间的争论的背景下进行的。对日本崛起的解释很少提及日本国家的发展。除了本迪克斯和巴林顿·摩尔的工作之外，关于国家发展的社会学讨论很少提及日本。本文的目的是将这两个研究领域带入互惠互利的对话中。文章的主题是现代日本国家的官僚主义特征异常明显。对此的解释是在日本前现代官僚体系的发展中寻求的，英国社会学杂志第XXXIX卷第2期此内容于2016年7月20日星期三05:39:07 UTC从157.55.39.30下载全部使用服从http://about.jstor.org/terms 229国家的官僚化和日本的崛起，与日本的官僚化形成鲜明对比中国，在社会学界很少受到关注。官僚国家与日本的军事和工业扩张联系在一起。日本的扩张常常被解释为源于日本民族性格或文化的非理性冲动。这里有人认为，军事和工业扩张都是官僚国家发展的结果。两者最初都是高度理性的，尽管两者，特别是军事扩张，后来都变得非理性，不是因为非理性力量以某种方式浮出水面，而是因为官僚国家的功能失调。就理论问题而言，本文与马克思主义和韦伯国家发展观之间的争论有关。这里采用的方法是韦伯式的，建立在胡贝尔和西尔伯曼等日本专业作家的见解之上，他们明确地运用了韦伯的思想。有人认为，日本的扩张可以从官僚国家的发展及其与其他国家的关系的角度来更好地理解，而不是从资本主义的发展和阶级冲突的动态角度来理解，正如摩尔和哈利迪提供的广义马克思主义论述中所主张的那样。 1. 作为一个官僚国家的日本 首先有必要证明日本发展成为一个极其官僚主义的现代国家这一说法的合理性。做出这种说法的第一个依据是日本明治政府的统治集团的性格。在明治时期（18681912），当日本将自己确立为一个强大的现代国家时，它不是由统治阶级控制，至少不是经典马克思主义意义上的统治阶级，而是由官僚控制。日本是真正意义上的官僚国家，由国家官员统治。其背景是，日本十九世纪的明治维新革命不是由资产阶级而是由武士进行的，武士控制了国家并使之现代化。武士是管理者而不是地主，不应与欧洲贵族相混淆。摩尔与德国的比较以及对日本“土地贵族”的提及在这里具有误导性。这并不是说不存在具有政治影响力的地主阶级，也不是说不存在武士地主，而是说，正如史密斯和本迪克斯所说，日本并不是由土地贵族统治的。资产阶级和地主都没有控制国家。它由来自萨摩和长州封建领地的前武士寡头统治，这些领地促成了明治维新（Moore 1969：253；Bendix 1969：221-8；Smith 1961：370-83）。第二个理由是政党随后的疲软此内容于2016年7月20日星期三05:39:07 UTC从157.55.39.30下载所有使用服从http://about.jstor.org/terms
The rise of Japan is explained in terms of the development of an exceptionally bureaucratic state. This resulted from the sixteenthcentury emergence of a ruling salariat separated from the land, the eventual overthrow of the pre-modern state by a revolutionary section of this salariat, and its subsequent building of a modern state. The early military expansion of Japan was directed in a highly rational manner by these bureaucrats. In the 1 930s, however, military expansion became irrational, in the sense that it became heedless of costs and consequences, and self-destructive, but this was not because of the resurgence of non-rational forces but rather because of the disintegration latent in the bureaucratic state. Defeat cleared the way for a resumption of economic expansion in a changed international situation. Economic growth did not happen automatically, however, but was directed by the economic bureaucracy, which used the institutions created by bureaucrats in the pre-war period. Economic expansion too has, arguably, become irrational and self-undermining but the parallel with military expansion should not be taken too far, for economic expansion has been much harder for the West to combat than military expansion. This analysis of the origins, development and expansion of the Japanese state is set in the context of the debate between Marxist and Weberian theory. Explanations of the rise of Japan have made little reference to the development of theJapanese state. Apart from the work of Bendix and Barrington Moore, the sociological discussion of the development of the state has made little reference to Japan. The aim of this article is to bring these two fields of inquiry into a mutually profitable dialogue. The theme of the article is that the modernJapanese state has been exceptionally bureaucratic in character. The explanation of this is sought in the development of Japan's pre-modern bureaucracy, The British Journal of Sociology Volumc XXXIX Number 2 This content downloaded from 157.55.39.30 on Wed, 20 Jul 2016 05:39:07 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 229 The bureaucratization of the state and the rise ofJapan which, in contrast with that of China, has received little attention in sociology. The bureaucratic state is then linked to Japan's military and industrial expansion. All too often Japan's expansion has been explained in terms of non-rational impulses stemming from Japanese national character or culture. It is argued here that both military and industrial expansion were consequences of the development of a bureaucratic state. Both were initially highly rational, though both, especially military expansion, became irrational later, not because non-rational forces in some way came to the surface but because of the dysfunctions of the bureaucratic state. So far as theoretical issues are concerned, the article has a bearing on the debate between the Marxist and Weberian approaches to the development of the state. The approach taken here is Weberian, building on the insights of specialist writers on Japan, such as Huber and Silberman, who have explicitly used the ideas of Weber. It is argued that the expansion ofJapan can be better understood in terms of the development of a bureaucratic state and its relations with other states than in terms of the development of capitalism and the dynamics of class conflict, as argued in the broadly Marxist accounts provided by Moore and Halliday. 1. JAPAN AS A BUREAUCRATIC STATE It is first necessary to justify the assertion that Japan developed an exceptionally bureaucratic modern state. The first ground for making this statement is the character of Meiji, Japan's ruling group. During the Meiji period (18681912), when Japan established itself as a powerful modern state, it was controlled not by a ruling class, at least not a ruling class in the classic Marxian sense, but by bureaucrats. Japan was a bureaucracy in the true sense of the word, rule by state officials. The background to this was that the Meiji Restoration, Japan's nineteenth-century revolution, was carried out not by a bourgeoisie but by samurai, who took control of the state and modernized it. The samurai were administrators not landowners and should not be confused with aristocracies of the European kind. Moore's comparisons with Germany and references toJapan's 'landed aristocracy' are here misleading. This is not to say that a politically influential landowning class did not exist or that there were no samurai landowners but that, as Smith and Bendix have argued, Japan was not ruled by a landed aristocracy. Neither bourgeoisie nor landowners controlled the state. It was ruled by an oligarchy of ex-samurai, from the feudal domains of Satsuma and Choshu, the domains that brought about the Meiji Restoration (Moore 1969:253; Bendix 1969:221-8; Smith 1961:370-83). The second ground is the subsequent weakness of political parties This content downloaded from 157.55.39.30 on Wed, 20 Jul 2016 05:39:07 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms