When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services
When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services
复制标题
公共信息何时会损害购买生态系统服务的反向拍卖的效率
DOI：
10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.12.004
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
7
通讯作者：
Tongzhe Li
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Messer;J. Duke;L. Lynch;Tongzhe Li
进行生态系统服务付费（PES）相关反向拍卖的政府机构传统上提供了大量关于过去拍卖结果的公共信息。这些信息不仅包括政府花费的金额，还可以包括有关已接受投标的各种信息。本研究以诱导价值实验来评估过去拍卖资讯对卖方（地主）寻租的影响。结果表明，卖家使用这些公共信息，并学习如何获得更高的租金。然而，当卖方只得到买方（政府机构）预算的信息时，他们可以获得较低的租金。研究结果还表明，相对预算规模影响租金和预算的随机变化，在市场信息的存在减少了效果。因此，在公共信息和等价的总支出的存在下，可变预算比固定预算更有可能实现拍卖财政效率，衡量拍卖是否在有限的预算下实现最大的PES效益。最后，本研究发现，拍卖与更大的异质性，卖方机会成本可能是较低的销售效率比当分布更均匀。
Government agencies that conduct reverse auctions related to the Payment of Ecosystem Services (PES) traditionally provide a significant amount of public information about past auction results. This information includes not only the amount of money spent by the government but also can include various information about the accepted bids. This research uses induced-value experiments to evaluate the effect of past auction information on seller (landholder) rent seeking. Results suggest that sellers use this public information and learn how to secure higher rents. However, when sellers are given information only about the buyer's (government agency's) budget, they secure lower rents. Results also suggest that relative budget size affects rents and that budget stochastic variability in the presence of market information diminishes the effect. Thus, in the presence of public information and equivalent total outlays, variable budgets are more likely than stationary budgets to achieve auction fiscal efficiency—the measure of whether the auction achieves the greatest PES benefits given its limited budget. Finally, this research finds that auctions with greater heterogeneity in seller opportunity costs are likely to be less fiscally efficient than when the distribution is more homogeneous.