The intermediate nuclear force missiles: An analysis of coupling and reassurance
The intermediate nuclear force missiles: An analysis of coupling and reassurance
复制标题
中型核力导弹：耦合与保证分析
DOI：
10.1080/03050629008434738
复制
发表时间：
1990
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
B. O'Neill
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. O'Neill
美国在欧洲部署中程核力量（INF）导弹的主要官方目的是通过将欧洲战争与全球战争联系起来来阻止华沙条约组织的入侵，并显示北约的凝聚力和决心。这两个理由是使用两个博弈论模型进行研究。耦合分析涉及部分可信的威胁，表明INF的最佳水平是积极的，但在实践中是不可能计算的，而且部署规模错误可能会降低威慑力。第二个概念，显示决心，有一个连贯的理由，适合事件的各种细节，但意味着政治上不可接受的结论，即INF只不过是对北约资源的公开破坏。
The main official purposes for installing American intermediate nuclear force (INF) missiles in Europe were to deter a Warsaw Pact invasion by linking a European war to a global one, and to show NATO's cohesion and resolve. These two rationales are investigated using two game‐theoretical models. The analysis of coupling, which involves partially credible threats, indicates that the optimal level of INF is positive, but is impossible to calculate in practice, and that a deployment of the wrong size may lessen deterrence. The second notion, showing resolve, has a coherent justification that fits various details of the episode, but implies the politcally unacceptable conclusion that INF is nothing more than a public destruction of NATO's resources.