A privacy-preserving and accountable authentication protocol for IoT end-devices with weaker identity
A privacy-preserving and accountable authentication protocol for IoT end-devices with weaker identity
复制标题
针对身份较弱的物联网终端设备的隐私保护和负责任的身份验证协议
DOI：
10.1016/j.future.2017.09.042
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发表时间：
2018-05-01
影响因子：
7.5
通讯作者：
Wang, Zhiwei
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Wang, Zhiwei
在大规模物联网(IoT)系统中，海量数据随时随地被收集，这可能会侵犯人们的隐私，特别是当系统用于医疗或日常生活环境时。保护隐私是一个重要的问题，更高的隐私要求通常会要求更弱的身份。然而，先前的研究表明，强安全性往往需要强身份，尤其是在身份验证过程中。因此，定义隐私和安全之间的良好权衡仍然是一个具有挑战性的问题。这促使我们开发了一种适用于身份较弱的物联网终端设备的隐私保护和责任认证协议，该协议集成了一种经过调整的短群签名构造和Shamir的秘密共享方案。我们分析了协议在六种典型攻击下的安全性质，并使用Proverif工具验证了协议的形式化安全性。在MacBook Pro和Intel Edison开发平台上的实验表明，我们的认证协议在实践中是可行的。(C)2017爱思唯尔B.V.保留所有权利。
In large-scale Internet of Things (IoT) systems, huge volumes of data are collected from anywhere at any time, which may invade people's privacy, especially when the systems are used in medical or daily living environments. Preserving privacy is an important issue, and higher privacy demands usually tend to require weaker identity. However, previous research has indicated that strong security tends to demand strong identity, especially in authentication processes. Thus, defining a good tradeoff between privacy and security remains a challenging problem. This motivates us to develop a privacy-preserving and accountable authentication protocol for IoT end-devices with weaker identity, which integrates an adapted construction of short group signatures and Shamir's secret sharing scheme. We analyze the security properties of our protocol in the context of six typical attacks and verify the formal security using the Proverif tool. Experiments using our implementation in MacBook Pro and Intel Edison development platforms show that our authentication protocol is feasible in practice. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.