Constituency Diversity, District Magnitude and Voter Co-ordination
Constituency Diversity, District Magnitude and Voter Co-ordination
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选区多样性、选区规模和选民协调
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
J. Potter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Potter
为什么有些选区的选民能够成功地协调他们对可行的政党产品的投票决定，而其他选区的选民却不能？此前有关选民协调失败的工作主要集中在机构和精英层面的解释上。这篇文章表明，选民本身的特点-特别是他们的社会人口多样性-可以发挥重要作用，塑造选民的集体能力，围绕可行的政党产品进行协调。它综合了来自组织心理学领域的集体决策理论和作为激励结构的制度理论，认为多样性在某些情况下会抑制集体协调，但在其他情况下不会。在这样做的时候，文章提供了一个新的因果机制，链接多样性和地区规模的政党系统的大小。这一论点是通过对12个国家下议院选举中数万名选民的跨国分析来检验的。
Why are voters in some electoral constituencies able to successfully co-ordinate their balloting decisions on viable party offerings, while those in other constituencies are not? Prior work on voter co-ordination failures has focused on institutional and elite-level explanations. This article demonstrates that characteristics of the voting constituencies themselves – specifically their socio-demographic diversity – can play an important role in shaping voters’ collective ability to co-ordinate around viable party offerings. It synthesizes theories of collective decision making from the field of organizational psychology with theories of institutions as incentive structures to argue that diversity inhibits collective co-ordination in some contexts, but not others. In so doing, the article offers a new causal mechanism that links diversity and district magnitude to party system size. The argument is tested using a cross-national analysis of tens of thousands of voters across lower house elections in twelve countries.
影响因子：
24.8
作者：
D. Messick;D. Mackie
通讯作者：
D. Messick;D. Mackie