Government Regulations on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
Government Regulations on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
复制标题
DOI：
10.3390/su11185030
复制
发表时间：
2019-09
期刊：
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Ziang Liu;T. Nishi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ziang Liu;T. Nishi
政府在促进供应链成员的回收战略中起着至关重要的作用。这项研究的目的是调查有关闭环供应链的最佳政府政策，以及这些政策如何影响市场需求以及制造商和零售商的返回策略。本文通过考虑一种新颖的三阶段游戏理论模型，介绍了政府法规下的闭环供应链的设计。首先，采用了Stackelberg模型来描述当地市场中制造商和零售商之间的单次游戏。其次，基于Stackelberg平衡，开发了重复且动态的人口游戏。第三，政府分析了人口游戏，以在整个市场中找到最佳的税收和补贴政策。为了解决所提出的模型，采用了向后归纳的概念。结果表明，通过收取税收并分配补贴，政府可以影响市场需求和收益率。政府和市场总是首选集中供应链结构。政府更喜欢将补贴分配给低污染，低利润的再制造产品。政府的环境关注会影响补贴政策。
The government plays a critical role in the promotion of recycling strategy among supply chain members. The purpose of this study is to investigate the optimal government policies on closed-loop supply chains and how these policies impact the market demand and the returning strategies of manufacturers and retailers. This paper presents a design of closed-loop supply chains under government regulation by considering a novel three-stage game theoretic model. Firstly, Stackelberg models are adopted to describe the one-shot game between the manufacturer and the retailer in a local market. Secondly, based on the Stackelberg equilibriums, a repeated and dynamic population game is developed. Thirdly, the government analyzes the population game to find the optimal tax and subsidy policies in the whole market. To solve the proposed model, the idea of backward induction is adopted. The results suggest that, by collecting tax and allocating subsidy, the government can influence the market demands and return rates. The centralized supply chain structure is always preferred for the government and the market. The government prefers to allocate subsidy to low-pollution, low-profit remanufactured products. The environmental attention of the government affects the subsidy policy.