International coordination of debt rules with time-inconsistent voters
International coordination of debt rules with time-inconsistent voters
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与时间不一致的选民进行债务规则的国际协调
DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12577
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发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Ryo Arawatari,Tetsuo Ono
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ryo Arawatari,Tetsuo Ono
在这项研究中，我们调查的债务规则的国际协调，在一个经济体中的几个国家组成的不同程度的目前的偏见。将每个国家制定自己的不协调债务规则的情况与所有国家都有共同的协调债务规则的情况进行比较。当前偏好较弱的国家会增加债务发行，并因参与协调而遭受福利损失。相比之下，具有强烈当前偏好的国家减少了债务发行，并可以通过参与协调来改善福利。对比的结果表明，具有弱现在偏好的国家几乎没有动机遵循协调规则。
In this study, we investigate the international coordination of debt rules in an economy consisting of several countries with varying degrees of present bias. A case wherein each country sets its own uncoordinated debt rules is compared with a case wherein all countries have common coordinated debt rules. Countries with weak present‐biased preferences increase their debt issuance and suffer from welfare losses by participating in coordination. In contrast, countries with strong present‐biased preferences reduce their debt issuance and can enjoy welfare improvement by participating in coordination. The contrasting results suggest the possibility that countries with weak present‐biased preferences have little incentive to follow the coordinated rule.