Two Levels of Pluralism
Two Levels of Pluralism
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多元主义的两个层次
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发表时间：
1992
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通讯作者：
S. Wolf
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作者：
S. Wolf
在我看来，伦理学中的多元主义是一种观点，认为存在着与道德判断相关的价值或原则的不可简化的多元。功利主义者认为，所有道德上重要的考虑都可以简化为快乐和痛苦的数量，康德主义者认为，所有道德判断都可以简化为一条原则，这条原则与尊重理性和理性的承担者有关，而多元主义者坚持认为，道德在基本层面上并非如此简单。此外，正如许多人所使用的术语，以及我将在本文中使用的术语，多元主义者认为，具有道德意义的价值的多元性不服从于一个完整的理性秩序。因此，人们认为，不存在任何原则或决策程序可以保证对涉及不同基本道德价值或原则之间的选择的每一个道德问题都有唯一和确定的答案。我在这篇文章中的目的并不是要论证伦理多元主义的真实性，而是要探讨其真实性的一些含义，甚至是对其真实性可能性的自觉认识。具体地说，我将论证，多元主义，或者实际上，甚至是多元主义的可能性，对我们理解有关道德客观性和道德相对主义的问题的方式，以及我们对这些问题所采取的立场，都有影响。我将首先概述一种关于这些问题的普遍思维模式。
Pluralism in ethics, as I understand it, is the view that there is an irreducible plurality of values or principles that are relevant to moral judgment. While the utilitarian says that all morally significant considerations can be reduced to quantities of pleasure and pain, and the Kantian says that all moraljudgment can be reduced to a single principle having to do with respect for rationality and the bearers of rationality, the pluralist insists that morality is not at the fundamental level so simple. Moreover, as many use the term, and as I shall use it in this essay, the pluralist believes that the plurality of morally significant values is not subject to a complete rational ordering. Thus, it is held that no principle or decision procedure exists that can guarantee a unique and determinate answer to every moral question involving a choice among different fundamental moral values or principles. My aim in this article is not to argue for the truth of ethical pluralism but, rather, to explore some implications of its truth, or even of the self-conscious recognition of the possibility of its truth. Specifically, I shall argue that pluralism, or, indeed, even the possibility of pluralism, has implications for the way we understand issues concerning moral objectivity and moral relativism, as well as implications for the positions we take on them. I shall begin by sketching a common pattern of thought about these issues.