Fiscal Activism and the Zero Nominal Interest Rate Bound
Fiscal Activism and the Zero Nominal Interest Rate Bound
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财政激进主义和零名义利率界限
DOI：
10.1111/jmcb.12395
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Sebastian Schmidt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sebastian Schmidt
我表明，零名义利率约束可能会使社会需要任命一个积极的政策制定者，他比私营部门更不关心政府支出相对于通胀的稳定和产出缺口的稳定。我使用一个简单的新凯恩斯主义模型，在这个模型中，政府必须重新决定每个时期的最优公共消费水平和一个时期的名义利率。在流动性陷阱中，一个激进的政策制定者会比一个偏好与整个社会相同的权威机构更积极地利用政府支出来稳定通胀和产出缺口。任命一名积极的政策制定者纠正自由裁量权JEL分类：E52，E62，E63
I show that the zero nominal interest rate bound may render it desirable for society to appoint a fiscally activist policy-maker who cares less about the stabilisation of government spending relative to inflation and output gap stabilisation than the private sector does. I work with a simple New Keynesian model where the government has to decide each period afresh about the optimal level of public consumption and the one period nominal interest rate. A fiscally activist policy-maker uses government spending more aggressively to stabilise inflation and the output gap in a liquidity trap than an authority with preferences identical to those of society as a whole would do. The appointment of an activist policy-maker corrects for discretionary authorities JEL Classification: E52, E62, E63