The power of human rights tribunals: Compliance with the European Court of Human Rights and domestic policy change
The power of human rights tribunals: Compliance with the European Court of Human Rights and domestic policy change
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人权法庭的权力：遵守欧洲人权法院和国内政策变化
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Hillebrecht
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Hillebrecht
当欧洲人权法院等国际人权法庭认定国家应对侵犯人权行为负责时，它们会要求政府向受害者支付赔偿，采取象征性措施，并制定必要的政策变革，以确保侵犯人权行为不再发生。这一条考虑的条件下，国家遵守这些裁决，特别是当法庭不能，往往不愿意提供严格的执行。本文将当前关于遵守国际人权法的国内政治的理论扩展到欧洲人权法院的案例。本文分析了一个新的，手工编码的数据集，关于国家遵守欧洲人权法院颁布的1000多项独立义务的情况，这些义务要求国家改变其人权政策。这些分析的结果表明，强有力的国内机构，特别是行政制约，是遵守欧洲人权法院的关键。当国内机构执行法院的裁决时，其结果可能是国家人权政策和做法的重大变化。
When international human rights tribunals like the European Court of Human Rights find states responsible for human rights abuses, they ask governments to pay reparation to the victims, engage in symbolic measures, and enact the policy changes necessary to ensure that the violations do not recur. This article considers the conditions under which states comply with these rulings, especially when the tribunals are unable and often unwilling to provide strict enforcement. This article extends current theories about the domestic politics of compliance with international human rights law to the case of the European Court of Human Rights. This article analyzes a new, hand-coded data set on states’ compliance with over 1000 discrete obligations handed down by the European Court of Human Rights that ask states to change their human rights policies. The results of these analyses suggest that robust domestic institutions, particularly executive constraints, are the key to compliance with the European Court of Human Rights. When domestic institutions enforce the Court’s rulings, the results can be significant changes in states’ human rights policies and practices.