Secure Cache Modeling for Measuring Side-channel Leakage
Secure Cache Modeling for Measuring Side-channel Leakage
复制标题
用于测量侧通道泄漏的安全缓存建模
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
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通讯作者：
Ee
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Uby;L. B.;Ee
侧信道攻击试图利用目标系统发出的物理信息来破坏系统的保密性。此类信息通过高速缓存侧信道泄露，而高速缓存侧信道可能存在于系统的许多部分。高速缓存是侧信道攻击中信息泄露的一个潜在源头，已经有许多相关攻击被提出。同时，也已经提出了不同的高速缓存架构来抵御这些攻击。因此，有必要评估所提出的防御方法的有效性。在本文中，我们提出了两种方法来评估系统对高速缓存侧信道攻击的脆弱性。首先，我们运行实际的攻击程序并恢复密钥，以直接表明目标系统是否可通过此类侧信道攻击被攻破。我们还提供了一种新的密钥投票指标来量化系统对攻击的脆弱性。实际攻击是准确的，但速度慢且针对特定密码。因此，我们基于高速缓存架构的新模型及其信息泄露可能性提出了第二种方法。我们定义了一种新颖的干扰矩阵来评估系统对整个高速缓存侧信道攻击类别（而非特定攻击）的脆弱性。这些模型可以就系统对侧信道攻击的脆弱性给出更全面的结论。最后，我们检查这两种方法是否给出一致的结果。
Side-channel attacks try to break a system’s confidentiality using physical information emitted from the targeted system. Such information is leaked out through cache side channels, which can exist in many parts of the system. Cache memories are a potential source of information leakage through side-channel attacks, many of which have been proposed. Meanwhile, different cache architectures have also been proposed to defend against these attacks. Thus it is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed defense approaches. In this paper, we propose two methods to evaluate a system’s vulnerability to cache side-channel attacks. First, we run actual attack programs and recover the cipher keys to directly show if the target system is attackable through such side-channel attacks. We also provide a new key-vote metric to quantify the system’s vulnerability to the attack. The actual attack is accurate, but is slow and cipher specific. Hence, we propose a second method based on new models of cache architectures and their information leakage potential. We define a novel Interference Matrix to evaluate a system’s vulnerability to entire categories of cache side-channel attacks, rather than to a specific attack. These models can give more comprehensive conclusions on a system’s vulnerability to side channel attacks. Finally we check whether the two methods give consistent results.