Group Lending, Joint Liability, and Social Capital
Group Lending, Joint Liability, and Social Capital
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团体贷款、连带责任和社会资本
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Stiglitz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Antara Haldar;J. Stiglitz
本文探讨了印度小额信贷危机的原因。通过将孟加拉国非常成功的格莱珉模式与据称“普遍化”版本的印度SKS小额信贷（引发危机）进行对比，可以看出，信任或社会资本是孤立的——不仅在标准经济理论中狭隘地解释，而且更广泛地解释——作为小额信贷早期成功的基本要素。有人认为，小额信贷的经验在分析和政策方面都被广泛误解。本文提出了将该模型扩展到营利性机构的固有局限性，特别是扩大规模的速度。
This article grapples with the causes of India’s microfinance crisis. By contrasting Bangladesh’s highly successful Grameen model with the allegedly “universalizable” version of India’s SKS Microfinance (which precipitated the crisis), trust or social capital is isolated—not just narrowly interpreted within standard economic theory, but more broadly construed—as the essential element accounting for the early success of microfinance. It is argued that the microfinance experience has been widely misinterpreted, in both analytical and policy terms. This article suggests inherent limits in extending the model to for-profit institutions and, in particular, to the pace of scaling up.