Trial runs as environmental policy with strategic frms
Trial runs as environmental policy with strategic frms
复制标题
环境政策与战略框架的试运行
DOI：
10.1007/s10018-021-00322-w
复制
发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Hajime Sugeta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takayoshi Shinkuma;Hajime Sugeta
自Weitzman（1974）提出信息不对称条件下，税收和标准孰优孰劣的环境政策问题以来，许多作者提出了税收和标准或排放交易方案的替代方案。本文所推荐的政策也是其中之一。该政策告诉我们，在试运行期间，政府可以任意设定税率。在试验期内，政府可以从可观察到的企业减排活动中提取私人信息。但是，政府需要的不仅仅是税收，还需要减免标准和违反标准的处罚，因为企业可能会对试行期间设定的税率做出战略性反应。这些补充政策手段可以通过使边际效益和边际成本相等来消除任何战略激励。因此，我们可以在试用期后获得第一最佳。
Since Weitzman (1974) raised a question on which is the better environmental policy tax or standard under asymmetric information, many authors have proposed alternatives to both tax and standard or emission trading scheme. The policy recommended in this paper is also one of them. The policy tells us that the government can set tax rates at arbitrary levels during the trial runs. The government can extract private information from observable abatement activities of firms in the trial periods. However, the government needs not only tax but also the standard for abatement and the penalty against violating the standard, because the firms may respond strategically to the tax rates set in the trial periods. Those supplemental policy devices can eliminate any strategic incentive by equating the marginal benefit and the marginal cost. As a result, we can attain the first best after the trial periods.