Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation game and other repeated public good games
Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation game and other repeated public good games
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.1106265108
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发表时间：
2011-09-20
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Zou, Yong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Heitzig, Jobst;Lessmann, Kai;Zou, Yong
正如《哥本哈根协议》所指出的那样，大多数国际社会都同意，不应允许全球平均气温比工业化前水平上升超过两摄氏度，以避免气候变化造成不可接受的损害。政府间气候变化专门委员会第四次评估报告和美国国家科学院最近的报告中提炼的科学证据表明，只有通过大幅减少温室气体排放才能实现这一目标。尽管如此，在温室气体减排方面的国际合作受到了搭便车和在不遵守协议的情况下重新谈判协议的激励，其他所谓的“公共利益游戏”也是如此。利用博弈论，我们证明了当问题的参数满足一些一般条件，并且参与者可以被认为是充分理性的时，如何用简单的线性补偿的动态策略来克服这些问题。拟议的战略以比例和及时的方式根据过去的合规水平重新分配负债。它可以用来实现任意给定的目标贡献分配，我们证明了它具有几个强的稳定性性质。
As the Copenhagen Accord indicates, most of the international community agrees that global mean temperature should not be allowed to rise more than two degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels to avoid unacceptable damages from climate change. The scientific evidence distilled in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and recent reports by the US National Academies shows that this can only be achieved by vast reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Still, international cooperation on greenhouse gas emissions reductions suffers from incentives to free-ride and to renegotiate agreements in case of noncompliance, and the same is true for other so-called "public good games." Using game theory, we show how one might overcome these problems with a simple dynamic strategy of linear compensation when the parameters of the problem fulfill some general conditions and players can be considered to be sufficiently rational. The proposed strategy redistributes liabilities according to past compliance levels in a proportionate and timely way. It can be used to implement any given allocation of target contributions, and we prove that it has several strong stability properties.