College education and income contingent loans in equilibrium
College education and income contingent loans in equilibrium
复制标题
大学教育和收入或有贷款均衡
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2022.08.005
复制
发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
Mazur Karol
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Matsuda Kazushige;Mazur Karol
2009年，美国政府推出了一项主要的收入或有贷款（ICLs）计划，为高等教育提供资金。我们研究了收入冲击、内生辍学风险和大学入学率对福利的影响。虽然ICL提供了宝贵的收入保险，从而增加了大学入学率的风险厌恶代理，他们也可能导致逆向选择的个人能力较低，并产生道德风险成本降低教育努力和劳动时间。我们评估这种保险激励权衡校准异构代理模型。我们表明，ICLs增加福利和逆向选择和道德风险的社会成本是温和的。
In 2009 the US government introduced a major income-contingent loans (ICLs) program for financing higher education. We investigate its welfare implications in the presence of income shocks, and endogenous dropout risk and college enrollment. While ICLs provide valuable income insurance and thereby increase college enrollment by risk averse agents, they may also lead to adverse selection of individuals with lower ability and generate a moral hazard cost of lowering educational effort and labor hours. We evaluate this insurance-incentives trade-off in a calibrated heterogeneous agent model. We show that ICLs increase welfare and that the social costs of adverse selection and moral hazard are mild.