Monetary and Macroprudential Policies Under Dollar-Denominated Foreign Debt
Monetary and Macroprudential Policies Under Dollar-Denominated Foreign Debt
复制标题
美元外债下的货币和宏观审慎政策
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.4186720
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Hidehiko Matsumoto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hidehiko Matsumoto
本文研究了一个对外借入外币的小型开放经济体的最优货币政策和宏观审慎政策。该模型具有一种新的机制，即由于偶尔具有约束力的借贷限制而突然停止，通过国际收支调整引发货币急剧贬值，从而增加外债的本币价值，造成严重的经济衰退。一项政策分析表明，紧缩性货币政策在危机期间减轻了贬值，但在危机期间对政策干预的预期会导致事前更大的借款，并破坏经济的稳定。对外国借款征收事前宏观审慎税和事后货币政策干预相结合，可以稳定经济和改善社会福利。
This paper studies the optimal monetary and macroprudential policies in a small open economy that borrows from abroad in foreign currency. The model features a novel mechanism in which sudden stops due to an occasionally binding borrowing constraint trigger a sharp currency depreciation through balance of payments adjustments, thereby increase the domestic-currency value of foreign debt and cause severe economic downturns. A policy analysis shows that a contractionary monetary policy mitigates depreciation during a crisis, but the anticipation of policy interventions during the crisis induces larger borrowings ex ante and destabilizes the economy. A combination of an ex ante macroprudential tax on foreign borrowing and ex post monetary policy interventions can stabilize the economy and improve social welfare.