THE FORMULATION OF DISJUNCTIVISM: A RESPONSE TO FISH
THE FORMULATION OF DISJUNCTIVISM: A RESPONSE TO FISH
复制标题
分离主义的形成：对鱼的回应
DOI：
10.1111/j.0066-7373.2004.00106.x
复制
发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
64.8
通讯作者：
P. Snowdon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Snowdon
费什提出，我们需要阐明“析取主义”代表什么，他还提出，它代表着对有关经验本质的原则的拒绝，他称之为决定性原则。本文认为他的第一个建议是合理的，但随后在第二节中指出，他的积极建议没有在正确的位置划清分离主义和非分离主义之间的界限。在第三节中，认为析取主义是关于知觉经验的特殊性质的论文，并且这里阐明的论文与某些其他关于知觉的思想（即直接实在论和麦克道尔的认识论析取主义）区别开来并与之相关。
Fish proposes that we need to elucidate what 'disjunctivism' stands for, and he also proposes that it stands for the rejection of a principle about the nature of experience that he calls the decisiveness principle. The present paper argues that his first proposal is reasonable, but then argues, in Section II, that his positive suggestion does not draw the line between disjunctivism and non-disjunctivism in the right place. In Section III, it is argued that disjunctivism is a thesis about the special nature of perceptual experience, and the thesis as elucidated here is then distinguished from and related to certain other ideas about perception, namely, direct realism and also McDowell's epistemological disjunctivism.