Mutual Funds’ Strategic Voting on Environmental and Social Issues

Mutual Funds’ Strategic Voting on Environmental and Social Issues
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共同基金对环境和社会问题的战略投票

DOI:
10.1093/rof/rfae017
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发表时间:
2024
期刊:
影响因子:
4.4
通讯作者:
Silvina Rubio
Silvina Rubio
中科院分区:
经济学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Roni Michaely;Silvina Rubio

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非ES家族中的环境和社会(ES)基金必须在纳入其宣传的利益相关者利益和最大化其家族青睐的股东价值之间取得平衡。我们发现这些基金支持远未达到多数门槛的 ES 提案,而在投票更有可能至关重要时则反对它们。这一策略导致对 ES 提案的平均支持率较高,这似乎符合其信托责任,同时反对有争议的 ES 提案。这种洗绿策略是由迎合机构投资者的非 ES 家族中的 ES 基金推动的。事实上,当这些基金为 ES 提案提供较低的平均支持时,流入量就会较低。这种战略投票不会出现在治理提案中,也不会出现在 ES 家族中的 ES 基金或非 ES 家族中的非 ES 基金中,这强化了战略投票的概念,以适应家族偏好,同时似乎满足了基金的受托人责任。凝胶:G11、G30、K22、M14
Environmental and social (ES) funds in non-ES families must balance incorporating the stakeholders’ interests they advertise and maximizing shareholder value favored by their families. We find that these funds support ES proposals that are far from the majority threshold, while opposing them when their vote is more likely to be pivotal. This strategy results in a high average support for ES proposals, seemingly consistent with their fiduciary responsibilities, while opposing contested ES proposals. This greenwashing strategy is driven by ES funds in non-ES families who cater to institutional investors. Indeed, these funds experience lower inflows when providing low average support for ES proposals. This strategic voting is not exhibited in governance proposals, nor by ES funds in ES families or by non-ES funds in non-ES families, reinforcing the notion of strategic voting to accommodate family preferences while appearing to meet the fiduciaries responsibilities of the funds. JEL: G11, G30, K22, M14