The Economics of Voluntary Versus Mandatory Labels
The Economics of Voluntary Versus Mandatory Labels
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DOI：
10.1146/annurev-resource-100913-012439
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发表时间：
2014-10
影响因子：
5.8
通讯作者：
B. Roe;M. Teisl;Corin R. Deans
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
B. Roe;M. Teisl;Corin R. Deans
标签解决了市场失灵信息不对称通过消费者，公司和纳税人承担的昂贵支出。在这篇评论中，我们探讨强制性和自愿性标签政策可能是社会最优的。虽然分析表面上围绕着简单的比较标签成本和随后的好处，从改善信息对称，更对称的信息可能会改变社会福利在其他方面，例如，通过改变外部性的生产、市场力量的行使或寻租活动的支出。我们审查的工作，有助于更全面的分析强制性和自愿性标签的相对优点，评估受影响群体的福利影响的分布，并讨论政治经济问题，特别是在国际贸易中的自愿标签的背景下。我们总结了强制性和自愿性标签的相对可取性的结果的关键模式，并讨论了在这一不断发展的文献可能的未来方向。
Labels address a market failure—asymmetric information—through costly expenditures borne by consumers, firms, and taxpayers. In this review, we explore when mandatory and voluntary labeling policies may be socially optimal. Although the analysis ostensibly revolves around simple comparisons of labeling costs and the subsequent benefits from improved information symmetry, more symmetric information may alter social welfare in other ways, e.g., by altering the production of externalities, the exercise of market power, or expenditures on rent-seeking activities. We review work that contributes to a more complete analysis of the relative merits of mandatory and voluntary labeling; that assesses the distribution of welfare effects across affected groups; and that discusses political economy issues, particularly in the context of voluntary labels in international trade. We summarize key patterns of results concerning the relative desirability of mandatory and voluntary labels and discuss likely future directions in this evolving literature.