Loan Officer Authority and Small Business Lending: Evidence from a Survey
Loan Officer Authority and Small Business Lending: Evidence from a Survey
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信贷员权威和小企业贷款：调查证据
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1657856
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Paolo Emilio Mistrulli
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Michele Benvenuti;Silvia Del Prete;L. Casolaro;Paolo Emilio Mistrulli
大量文献强调，小银行在小企业贷款方面具有比较优势。在本文中，我们表明，除了规模，这是负相关的银行专业化的小企业贷款，组织特征影响银行贷款组合的选择。通过使用一个独特的数据集的基础上，最近的一项调查，意大利银行，我们发现，控制后的银行规模，一个分支贷款人员的权威有一个关键作用，在解释银行专业化的小企业贷款。特别是，将更多决策权下放给分支贷款官员的银行比其他银行更愿意贷款给小企业。我们通过控制影响信贷员激励的几个因素来近似分析信贷员的权力：信贷员的流动率、他们被允许自主贷款的金额、他们在贷款审批和设定贷款利率方面的作用、用于筛选和监控借款人的信息种类（软信息与硬信息）以及他们的薪酬计划结构。
A vast literature has emphasized that small banks are at a comparative advantage in small business lending. In this paper, we show that apart from size, which is negatively correlated with bank specialization in small business lending, organizational characteristics affect bank loan portfolio choices. By using a unique dataset based on a recent survey of Italian banks, we find that after having controlled for bank size, a branch loan officer’s authority has a key role in explaining bank specialization in small business lending. In particular, banks which delegate more decision-making power to their branch loan officers are more willing to lend to small firms than other banks. We approximate loan officers’ authority by controlling for several factors which shape their incentives: loan officer turnover, the amount of money up to which they are allowed to lend autonomously, their role in loan approval and in setting loan interest rates, the kind of information (soft versus hard information) used for screening and monitoring borrowers, and the structure of their compensation schemes.