Game theory and human evolution: A critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games
Game theory and human evolution: A critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games
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DOI：
10.1016/j.tpb.2005.09.005
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发表时间：
2006-05-01
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Hammerstein, P
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hagen, EH;Hammerstein, P
经济学家和心理学家一直在测试人类行为博弈论模型的纳什均衡预测。在许多情况下，人类并不符合这些预测。这些结果引起了生物学家的极大兴趣，因为它们也对著名的ESS合作模式提出了质疑。在某些一次性、匿名互动中的合作，以及愿意以自己的净成本惩罚他人，是与标准理论最耐人寻味的偏离。对这些结果提出的一个受到越来越多关注的解释是，文化群体选择了“关于他者”的社会规范。我们批判性地回顾了这一解释。我们的结论是，实验结果揭示了经济学家和进化生物学家常用的两种认知结构隐含模型的局限性。(C)2006 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。
Economists and psychologists have been testing Nash equilibrium predictions of game theory models of human behavior. In many instances, humans do not conform to the predictions. These results are of great interest to biologists because they also raise questions about well-known ESS models of cooperation. Cooperation in certain one-shot, anonymous interactions, and a willingness to Punish others at a net cost to oneself are some of the most intriguing deviations from standard theory. One proposed explanation for these results that is receiving increasing attention invokes the cultural group selection of 'other regarding' social norms. We critically review this explanation. We conclude that experimental results reveal limits in two implicit models of cognitive structure commonly employed by economists and evolutionary biologists. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.