Meeting the challenge of impact investing: how can contracting practices secure social impact without sacrificing performance?
Meeting the challenge of impact investing: how can contracting practices secure social impact without sacrificing performance?
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应对影响力投资的挑战：承包实践如何在不牺牲绩效的情况下确保社会影响？
DOI：
10.1080/20430795.2013.776260
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
4.3
通讯作者：
Madeleine R. Evans
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Madeleine R. Evans
有影响力的投资者寻求财务回报和积极的经济、社会或环境影响。尽管影响力投资行业的某些领域将强劲回报和高积极影响视为相互冲突的目标，但其他人辩称，这两个目标的强劲表现可以同时实现。尽管这个问题对该行业很重要，但目前还没有一个被广泛接受的框架，使影响力投资者能够确定他们是否能够以及如何在不进行权衡的情况下进行投资。本文运用契约理论和多任务委托代理关系中的激励分析，试图填补这一空白。对于影响力投资者，本文开创了讨论策略的理论框架，提供了第一组假设，这些假设可以通过进一步的理论工作来阐述，并根据实际经验进行检验。在契约理论中，本文最符合应用的多任务文献，涉及分配给金融和环境任务的代理人(Sclair-Desgagné，B.和H.L.Gabel)。1997年。“管理系统和公共政策中的环境审计。”《环境经济与管理杂志》33(3)：331-346；Lothe，S.，I.Myrtveit和T.1999年。“改善环境绩效的补偿制度。”商业战略与环境8(6)：313-321；Lothe，S.和I.Myrtveit。2003年。“绿色战略实施的补偿制度：参数方法和非参数方法。”商业战略和环境(12(3)：191-203)，而该理论引用了霍姆斯特罗姆和米尔格罗姆(1991)的模型。多任务委托代理分析：激励合同、资产所有权和工作设计。《法律、经济与组织》杂志7：24-52)，费尔萨姆和谢(1994)。“多任务委托/代理关系中的绩效衡量一致性和多样性。”《会计评论》(69(3)：429-453)和巴德(2007)。“绩效衡量一致性和平衡计分卡。”《会计研究杂志》45(3)：515-539)。
Impact investors seek financial return and positive economic, social or environmental impact. While certain segments of the impact investing industry see strong returns and high positive impact as conflicting objectives, others argue that strong performance across both objectives can be simultaneously achieved. Despite the importance of this question to the industry, no widely accepted framework exists that enables impact investors to determine whether and how they will be able to invest without a trade-off. This article draws on contract theory and the analysis of incentives in multitask principal–agent relationships in an attempt to fill the void. For impact investors, this article pioneers a theoretical framework for the discussion of strategy, offering a first set of hypotheses that can be elaborated through further theoretical work and tested against actual experience. Within contract theory, this article fits most closely alongside the applied multitask literature concerned with an agent assigned to a financial and an environmental task (Sinclair-Desgagné, B., and H. L. Gabel. 1997. “Environmental Auditing in Management Systems and Public Policy.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 33 (3): 331–346; Lothe, S., I. Myrtveit, and T. Trapani. 1999. “Compensation Systems for Improving Environmental Performance.” Business Strategy and the Environment 8 (6): 313–321; Lothe, S., and I. Myrtveit. 2003. “Compensation Systems for Green Strategy Implementation: Parametric and Non-Parametric Approaches.” Business Strategy and the Environment 12 (3): 191–203), while the theory referenced within bridges models from Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991. “Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 7: 24–52), Feltham and Xie (1994. “Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multitask Principal/Agent Relations.” The Accounting Review 69 (3): 429–453) and Budde (2007. “Performance Measure Congruity and the Balanced Scorecard.” Journal of Accounting Research 45 (3): 515–539).