Triviality arguments against functionalism
Triviality arguments against functionalism
复制标题
反对功能主义的琐碎论证
DOI：
10.1007/s11098-008-9231-3
复制
发表时间：
2009
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
P. Godfrey‐Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Godfrey‐Smith
在心灵哲学中，反对功能主义的“琐碎论点”认为，某些复杂的物理系统表现出给定的功能组织的主张要么是琐碎的，要么比通常假设的内容少得多。我调查了几个早期的这种论点，并提出了一个新的，克服了一些局限性，在早期的论点。抵制琐碎的论点是可能的，但要求功能主义者修改流行的观点“自主”的功能描述。
“Triviality arguments” against functionalism in the philosophy of mind hold that the claim that some complex physical system exhibits a given functional organization is either trivial or has much less content than is usually supposed. I survey several earlier arguments of this kind, and present a new one that overcomes some limitations in the earlier arguments. Resisting triviality arguments is possible, but requires functionalists to revise popular views about the “autonomy” of functional description.