Earnings management and equity incentives: evidence from the European banking industry
Earnings management and equity incentives: evidence from the European banking industry
复制标题
盈余管理和股权激励：来自欧洲银行业的证据
DOI：
10.1108/ijaim-08-2017-0094
复制
发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
30.2
通讯作者：
Bassam Al
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mohammad Alhadab;Bassam Al
目的
本文以2006-2011年的204个银行年度为样本，考察了股权激励对利用贷款损失准备金进行盈余管理的影响。
设计/方法/方式
作者使用39家欧洲银行的数据来检验主要假设。运用多种估值模型和回归分析方法对高管薪酬的主要替代指标和贷款损失准备金的决定因素进行了测算。
结果
实证结果表明，银行业通过任意性贷款损失准备进行盈余管理与股权激励存在关联。特别是，欧洲银行的高管与高股权激励被发现管理报告的收益向上减少贷款损失准备金。因此，研究结果表明，增加收入的盈余管理，通过酌情贷款损失准备金是广泛实行的欧洲银行的高管，这部分是由高管的薪酬。
实际影响
本文的研究结果提出了重要的影响，监管机构在欧盟，谁应该采取进一步措施，改革监管环境，以监测和减轻盈余管理的做法，通过操纵贷款损失准备金发生。盈余管理行为不仅会对后续业绩产生负面影响，而且会导致公司的失败。因此，监管机构应采取必要的改革，以保护利益相关者（投资者、债权人等）的财富。
独创性/价值
本研究首次提供了欧洲银行业股权激励与盈余管理之间关系的证据。这项研究进一步阐明了一个广泛受众非常感兴趣的问题，而这个问题在先前的研究中没有得到太多的关注，从而为未来的研究开辟了新的途径。
Purpose
This study aims to examine the effect of equity incentives on earnings management that occurs via the use of loan loss provisions by using a sample of 204 bank-year observations over the period 2006-2011.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use the data of 39 European banks to test the main hypothesis. Several valuation models and regressions are used to measure the main proxies for executives’ compensation and the determinant factors of loan loss provisions.
Findings
The empirical results reveal that earnings management that occurs via discretionary loan loss provisions is associated with equity incentives in the banking industry. In particular, European banks’ executives with high equity incentives are found to manage reported earnings upwards by reducing loan loss provisions. The results therefore show that income-increasing earnings management via discretionary loan loss provisions is widely practised by the executives of European banks and that this is partly motivated by executives’ compensation.
Practical implications
The findings of this paper present important implications for regulators in the European Union, who should take further steps to reform the regulatory environment to monitor and mitigate the earnings management practices that occur via the manipulation of loan loss provisions. Earnings management practices do not just negatively affect subsequent performance but are also found to lead to firms’ failure. Thus, regulators should take the necessary reforms to protect the wealth of stakeholders (investors, creditors, etc.).
Originality/value
This study provides the first evidence on the relationship between equity incentives and earnings management in the European banking industry. The study sheds more light on an issue of great interest to a broad audience that does not receive much attention in the prior research, thus opening new avenues for future research.