A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation
A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation
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DOI：
10.1162/003355399556151
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发表时间：
1999-08-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Schmidt, KM
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fehr, E;Schmidt, KM
有强有力的证据表明，人们在竞争性市场中利用他们的讨价还价能力，而不是在双边讨价还价的情况下。还有强有力的证据表明，人们在自愿合作游戏中利用搭便车的机会。然而，当他们有机会惩罚搭便车者时，稳定的合作得以维持，尽管惩罚对惩罚者来说代价高昂。这篇论文提出了一个问题，是否有一个简单的共同原则可以解释这个令人困惑的证据。我们表明，如果有人关心公平的难题可以解决。结果表明，经济环境决定了是公平类型还是自私类型主导均衡行为。
There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a simple common principle that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior.