Naked Exclusion and the Anticompetitive Accommodation of Entry
Naked Exclusion and the Anticompetitive Accommodation of Entry
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赤裸裸的排斥和进入的反竞争便利
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.937863
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Julian Wright
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Julian Wright
当现有进入者和潜在进入者提供差异化产品并且买家是下游公司时，我们模拟独家交易。虽然由此产生的独家交易总是反竞争的，但它并不一定涉及取消抵押品赎回权。相反，当产品充分差异化时，现有企业会利用排他性交易，通过限制竞争对手产品的下游竞争来进一步软化竞争。另一方面，当产品差异化不大时，这种战略效应较弱，现有企业通过签约所有下游企业、排除进入者并提高行业利润而表现更好。
We model exclusive dealing when the incumbent and potential entrant offer differentiated products and buyers are downstream firms. While the resulting exclusive dealing is always anticompetitive, it does not necessarily involve foreclosure. Rather, when products are sufficiently differentiated, the incumbent uses exclusive deals to further soften competition by limiting downstream competition for the rival's product. On the other hand, when products are not much differentiated, this strategic effect is weak and the incumbent does better by signing up all downstream firms, excluding the entrant, and raising industry profits.