A Non-Cooperative Analysis of Hotelling's Location Game
A Non-Cooperative Analysis of Hotelling's Location Game
复制标题
Hotelling位置博弈的非合作分析
DOI：
10.1006/game.1996.0012
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Thadden
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Bester;A. Palma;W. Leininger;Jonathan P. Thomas;E. Thadden
摘要研究了霍特林空间竞争模型中的区位均衡问题。如d‘Aspremont等人。已经表明，在消费者运输成本为二次的情况下，两家卖家将寻求尽可能远离对方。我们证明了位置博弈具有无穷多个混合策略纳什均衡。在这些均衡中，协调失败使“最大差异化”原则失效，企业甚至可能位于同一点。经济文献分类编号：C72、D43、L11。
Abstract We study the location equilibrium in Hotelling's model of spatial competition. As d'Aspremont et al. have shown, with quadratic consumer transportation cost the two sellers will seek to move as far away from each other as possible. We show that the location game possesses an infinity of mixed strategy Nash equilibria. In these equilibria coordination failure invalidates the principle of “maximum differentiation” and firms may even locate at the same point. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43, L11.