Antineutrino reactor safeguards - a case study
Antineutrino reactor safeguards - a case study
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反中微子反应堆保障措施——案例研究
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Jaffke
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Christensen;P. Huber;P. Jaffke
反中微子作为反应堆保障措施的一种手段已经提出了30多年，在中微子探测方面取得了令人印象深刻的实验进展。在本文中，我们进行，第一次，反中微子保障措施的应用到一个现实世界的情况下，在1994年的朝鲜核危机的案例研究。我们得出的检测极限，部分或全部核心放电在1989年的基础上，实际原子能机构的保障访问，并发现，两个独立的方法会产生积极的证据，第二个核心具有很高的信心。为了推广我们的研究结果，我们提供了详细的估计灵敏度的钚含量的各种类型的反应堆，包括大多数类型的钚生产反应堆，详细的反应堆模拟的基础上。这项研究的一个关键发现是，热功率小于0.1-1千兆瓦时的各种反应堆都可以得到保障，实现原子能机构在反应堆建筑物外使用探测器的定量灵敏度和及时性目标。这种类型的保障措施不依赖于知识的连续性，并实时提供有关堆芯库存和动力状态的信息。
Antineutrinos have been proposed as a means of reactor safeguards for more than 30 years and there has been impressive experimental progress in neutrino detection. In this paper we conduct, for the first time, a case study of the application of antineutrino safeguards to a real-world scenario - the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994. We derive detection limits to a partial or full core discharge in 1989 based on actual IAEA safeguards access and find that two independent methods would have yielded positive evidence for a second core with very high confidence. To generalize our results, we provide detailed estimates for the sensitivity to the plutonium content of various types of reactors, including most types of plutonium production reactors, based on detailed reactor simulations. A key finding of this study is that a wide class of reactors with a thermal power of less than 0.1-1 GWth can be safeguarded achieving IAEA goals for quantitative sensitivity and timeliness with detectors right outside the reactor building. This type of safeguards does not rely on the continuity of knowledge and provides information about core inventory and power status in real-time.