Robust Social Decisions

Robust Social Decisions
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DOI:
10.1257/aer.20150678
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发表时间:
2016-09-01
影响因子:
10.7
通讯作者:
Tallon, Jean-Marc
Tallon, Jean-Marc
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Danan, Eric;Gajdos, Thibault;Tallon, Jean-Marc

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我们提出并实施规范性原则,以在个人可能具有不精确和异质的信仰以及相互冲突的品味或利益时指导社会决策。为此,我们将标准帕累托原则应用于那些对信仰不精确性具有稳健性的偏好比较,并描述尊重这一稳健原则的社会偏好。我们还对这一原则进行了适当的限制。前一个原则在能够满足的情况下提供了更强的指导意义;当它不能时,后者总是提供最低限度的指导。
We propose and operationalize normative principles to guide social decisions when individuals potentially have imprecise and heterogeneous beliefs, in addition to conflicting tastes or interests. To do so, we adapt the standard Pareto principle to those preference comparisons that are robust to belief imprecision and characterize social preferences that respect this robust principle. We also characterize a suitable restriction of this principle. The former principle provides stronger guidance when it can be satisfied; when it cannot, the latter always provides minimal guidance.