A Crisis of Banks as Liquidity Providers
A Crisis of Banks as Liquidity Providers
复制标题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2022301
复制
发表时间：
2013-10
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
V. Acharya;Nada Mora
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
V. Acharya;Nada Mora
面对金融危机，银行能否保持其作为流动性提供者的优势？尽管银行兑现了企业在2007年至2009年危机期间提供的信贷额度，但这种流动性拨备之所以可能，是因为政府和政府支持机构提供了明确的、大量的支持。危机爆发时，流入银行的总存款减少，贷存缺口扩大。这些模式在有更多未提取承诺的银行中表现得很明显。这些银行试图通过提供更高的利率来吸引存款，但由此产生的私人资金不足以弥补缺口，它们减少了新的信贷。
Can banks maintain their advantage as liquidity providers when exposed to a financial crisis? While banks honored credit lines drawn by firms during the 2007 to 2009 crisis, this liquidity provision was only possible because of explicit, large support from the government and government-sponsored agencies. At the onset of the crisis, aggregate deposit inflows into banks weakened and their loan-to-deposit shortfalls widened. These patterns were pronounced at banks with greater undrawn commitments. Such banks sought to attract deposits by offering higher rates, but the resulting private funding was insufficient to cover shortfalls and they reduced new credit.