Forgive but not Forget: The Behavior of Relationship Banks When Firms are in Distress
Forgive but not Forget: The Behavior of Relationship Banks When Firms are in Distress
复制标题
原谅但不要忘记：企业陷入困境时关系银行的行为
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2608950
复制
发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Larissa Schäfer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Larissa Schäfer
关系银行能帮助陷入困境的公司吗？结合调查为基础的措施，关系贷款与独特的信用登记数据，我研究关系贷款对贷款绩效的影响。我发现，同一家公司在同一时期更有可能成为拖欠的关系为基础的贷款相对于交易为基础的贷款。然而，当贷款到期时，相对于交易银行而言，较高的拖欠率不会导致关系银行更多的违约或更少的贷款收回。以过去的拖欠情况为条件，关系银行更有可能提供后续融资并收取租金。与理论一致，关系银行容忍暂时的不良结果，但提取租金和确保未来的业务作为回报。本文提供了新的经验证据，租金提取的关系银行，一直宽容的陷入困境的公司在过去。
Do relationship banks help firms in distress? Combining a survey-based measure of relationship lending with unique credit registry data, I examine the effect of relationship lending on loan performance. I find that the same firm in the same time period is more likely to become delinquent on a relationship-based loan relative to a transaction-based loan. Higher delinquencies do not, however, result in more defaults or less loan recoveries for relationship banks when loans mature relative to transactional banks. Conditional on past delinquencies, relationship banks are more likely to offer follow-up financing and extract rents. Consistent with theory, relationship banks tolerate temporarily bad results, yet extract rents and secure future business in return. The paper provides new empirical evidence for rent extraction by relationship banks that have been lenient to distressed firms in the past.