Regulating Conflicts of Interest: The Effect of Sanctions and Enforcement
Regulating Conflicts of Interest: The Effect of Sanctions and Enforcement
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1786523
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发表时间：
2013-02
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Dubois;L. Frésard;Pascal Dumontier
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Dubois;L. Frésard;Pascal Dumontier
本文研究了法律制裁和执法如何影响经纪人因投资银行活动而产生的利益冲突。我们利用最近在欧洲各国采用的市场滥用指令(MAD)，并利用欧洲现有的法律制裁和执法方面的差异来确定经纪商的反应。总体而言，MAD的颁布大大减少了乐观的投资建议。在配备了更严厉的法律制裁的国家和严格执行规则的国家，这一削减幅度更大。我们的分析强调了法律制裁和执法权力的重要性，以了解监管变化的真正后果。
This article studies how legal sanctions and enforcement affect brokers’ conflicts of interest emanating from investment banking activities. We exploit the recent adoption of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) across European countries and use the variation in legal sanctions and enforcement that exists in Europe to identify brokers’ reaction. Overall, the enactment of MAD significantly reduced optimistic investment advice. This reduction is larger in countries equipped with more severe legal sanctions and in countries that strongly enforce the rules. Our analysis underscores the importance of legal sanctions and enforcement power to understand the real consequences of regulatory changes.