A Model of Temptation-Induced Compromise ⁄
A Model of Temptation-Induced Compromise ⁄
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诱惑导致的妥协模型 ⁄
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Madhav Chandrasekher
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Madhav Chandrasekher
本文建立了菜单选择问题的模型，其中决策者(DM)在选择的事前阶段面临诱惑，并通过妥协来应对这种诱惑。我们引入了一类新的实用程序，称为范畴模型，它捕捉到了这一现象，并为该模型提供了公理基础。我们的理论提供了一种模拟诱惑的方法，不同于古尔-佩森多费尔(GP)(2001)提出的代价高昂的自我控制方法。此外，它还清晰地描述了决策理论文献中当前感兴趣的两种行为现象--妥协效应和吸引效应。本文的创新之处在于，我们认为诱惑是导致这两个结果的共同原因，并将这两个特征都嵌套在一个折衷的公理模型中。
This paper models menu choice problems in which the decision maker (DM) faces temptation at the ex ante stage of choice and responds to this temptation by making a compromise. We introduce a new class of utilities, called the category model, which captures this phenomenon and provide axiomatic foundations for this model. Our theory provides an approach to modeling temptation that is distinct from the costly self-control approach, initiated by Gul-Pesendorfer (GP) (2001). Moreover, it provides a sharp representation of two behavioral phenomena of current interest in the decision theory literature - the compromise efiect and the attraction efiect. The innovation of this paper is that we identify temptation as a common cause for both of these efiects and nest both of these features within an axiomatic model of compromise.