An Experimental Study on the Incentives of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
An Experimental Study on the Incentives of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
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概率串行机制激励的实验研究
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Vanberg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
David Hugh;Morimitsu Kurino;C. Vanberg
我们报告了一个关于分配不可分割货物的概率串行（PS）机制的实验。 PS 机制是最近发现的广泛使用的随机串行独裁机制的替代方案，如果人们如实报告自己的偏好，则具有有吸引力的公平性和效率特性。然而，该机制不具备策略证明，因此参与者可能不会如实报告他们的偏好。我们调查了 PS 机制的一组简单应用中的误报。我们让受试者面对理论表明有动机或没有动机误报的情况。在误报符合纳什均衡的情况下，我们发现很少有误报。然而，我们也发现，在这样做实际上没有任何好处的情况下，存在很大程度的误报。这些发现表明 PS 机制在真实诱导方面可能存在问题。
We report an experiment on the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism for allocating indivisible goods. The PS mechanism, a recently discovered alternative to the widely used Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism, has attractive fairness and efficiency properties if people report their preferences truthfully. However, the mechanism is not strategy-proof, so participants may not truthfully report their preferences. We investigate misreporting in a set of simple applications of the PS mechanism. We confront subjects with situations in which the theory suggests that there is an incentive or no incentive to misreport. We find little misreporting in situations where misreporting is a Nash equilibrium. However, we also find a significant degree of misreporting in situations where there is actually no benefit to doing so. These findings suggest that the PS mechanism may have problems in terms of truthful elicitation.