New foundations for counterfactuals
New foundations for counterfactuals
复制标题
反事实的新基础
DOI：
10.1007/s11229-013-0391-0
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
F. Huber
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Huber
哲学家在为反事实条件句提供语义时通常依赖于直觉。然而，关于反事实条件的直觉是出了名的不可靠。本文的目的是为反事实条件句的语义提供一个原则性的解释。这种原则性的解释是由我所称的皇家规则提供的，这是与机会和可信度相关的主要原则的确定性类比。皇家规则说，一个理想的未知智能体对命题$$A$$ a的初始不相信等级，假设在给定环境中与最接近的$$A$$ a世界的反事实距离等于$$n$$ n，并且在此环境中没有不被接受的进一步信息，应该等于$$n$$ n。在给定环境的预设在此环境中是可接受的两个假设下，既然确定性真性理论或形而上学模态理论在任何情况下都是可以接受的，那么在给定的情况下，反事实距离分布具有排序函数的结构。对于反事实的秩论语义，证明了基本条件逻辑V是健全和完备的。
Philosophers typically rely on intuitions when providing a semantics for counterfactual conditionals. However, intuitions regarding counterfactual conditionals are notoriously shaky. The aim of this paper is to provide a principled account of the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. This principled account is provided by what I dub the Royal Rule, a deterministic analogue of the Principal Principle relating chance and credence. The Royal Rule says that an ideal doxastic agent’s initial grade of disbelief in a proposition $$A$$A, given that the counterfactual distance in a given context to the closest $$A$$A-worlds equals $$n$$n, and no further information that is not admissible in this context, should equal $$n$$n. Under the two assumptions that the presuppositions of a given context are admissible in this context, and that the theory of deterministic alethic or metaphysical modality is admissible in any context, it follows that the counterfactual distance distribution in a given context has the structure of a ranking function. The basic conditional logic V is shown to be sound and complete with respect to the resulting rank-theoretic semantics of counterfactuals.